

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A6115

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, Calif.,
minority group distribution, July 31, 1963

words "Negroes" and "minority groups," but there was no doubt that it referred to the hiring and promotions of Negroes.

security of the country depends first, upon determining what they are, and, second, upon actually taking those actions specifically determined to be necessary to meet the "criteria." Any error risking action less than the minimum necessary must be scrupulously avoided. Uncertainties always must be resolved positively, on the safe side, to make certain we adequately flesh-out all the necessary specifics of each of these skeletal general criteria.

Unfortunately, these specifics will involve a considerable effort because of the magnitude of the risks and disadvantages involved.

You, yourself, on February 7, 1962, described an atmospheric treaty without an adequate "inspections system" guarding against preparations for surprise abrogation as "extremely vulnerable." The treaty at hand, of course, has no "inspections system" at all—adequate or inadequate.

Again, on March 2, 1962, you warned that if we are to maintain our scientific momentum and leadership, "our weapons progress must not be limited to theory or to the confines of laboratories and caves." The treaty at hand, of course, does fix such limitations.

At that time you also warned: "in actual practice, particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep top-flight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an experiment which may or may not take place at an uncertain date in the future. Nor can large technical laboratories be kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for some other nation to break an agreement. This is not only difficult or inconvenient—we have explored this alternative and found it impossible of execution."

Thus, observing your assurances and promises respecting the treaty calls for doing the difficult and, in addition, what you yourself have described as the impossible. It will surely call for a large expenditure and a large effort—much larger than Secretary McNamara indicated during his treaty testimony. For instance, his off-hand estimate of the cost of maintaining a readiness-to-test posture was \$200 million. My own calculations, detailed below, considerably enlarge this figure.

Unfortunately, also, there appears to be a line of resistance developing domestically against the taking of these vitally necessary actions at all. This was hinted in a recent letter to the editor of the New York Times written by the scientists, Dr. Eugene P. Wigner. It was amplified in a letter to the editor of the New York Herald-Tribune by the scientists, Dr. Leo Szilard, who argued that should the vigorous underground testing program be carried out, "then, rather than furthering the cause of peace, the test ban agreement would be likely to do just the opposite." Presumably his same reasoning also would apply in opposition to the other three categories of action to which you are committed. I note with apprehension that the thinking of even some of your official family seems to parallel that of Wigner and Szilard.

Thus, keeping your assurances and promises regarding steps to reduce the risks and disadvantages of the test ban treaty will require, on your part, overcoming the resistance of some of the very people who work closely with you, as well as others who have given you strong and consistent political support.

In determining what, specifically, will have to be done to meet and keep your assurances and promises, certain fundamental considerations must be in mind. With respect to each of the criteria, these include:

UNDERGROUND TEST PROGRAM

Either a community must be built at the Nevada test site for personnel working there, or a rapid transit system from Las Vegas must be constructed in order to attract and keep topflight personnel on the work.

Due to the proximity of both the city of Las Vegas and the Hoover Dam to the Nevada

Overcoming Risks and Disadvantages of Test Ban Treaty Costly but Vital to United States National Security

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CRAIG HOSMER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 30, 1963

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, for the information of my colleagues, I have asked that a copy of my September 24 letter to President Kennedy, relating to the actions necessary to minimize the admitted risks and disadvantages of the partial nuclear test ban treaty, be reproduced here. The letter is as follows:

SEPTEMBER 24, 1963.

Re reductions of risks and disadvantages of the limited test ban treaty.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Secretary Dean Rusk, Secretary Robert McNamara, Under Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Dr. Glenn Seaborg, you and others in your administration have conceded that there are risks and disadvantages in the limited test ban treaty. This concession is implicitly from your assurances and promises to take steps to reduce the effects of these risks and disadvantages upon the national security.

The assurances and promises given have been instrumental in obtaining both Senate and public support for ratification of the treaty. In this sense, they constitute a solemn compact between you and the American people, which must be kept.

Amongst the steps to be taken, as outlined in separate communications each dated August 23, 1963, to Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, from Under Secretary Gilpatric and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are the following:

1. The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs.
2. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities manned by top-flight scientific personnel.
3. The maintenance of facilities and resources necessary for prompt resumption of atmospheric testing in the event of Soviet abrogation of the treaty or should the national security otherwise require.
4. The improvement of our capability to detect treaty violations and Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements.

Unfortunately, these assurances and promises have been only general in nature. What, specifically, in terms of personnel, materiel and programs are needed to meet and keep them are yet to be determined. The Joint Chiefs' communication defined them as "criteria" and added that they were stated "necessarily in general language since additional study will be needed to determine specific standards and programs."

Obviously and regrettably, these specifics were not worked out before the treaty was negotiated. Had this been done, perhaps the treaty terms might have been written to make them less onerous and less expensive to carry out. In any event, the fundamental

	1962			
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
A. Total	11,035		10,320	
Negro	865	7.74	894	8.65
Oriental	393	3.55	387	3.75
Other	152	1.38	190	1.84
Total minority	1,410	12.8	1,471	14.2
B. White collar	1,988		1,890	
Negro	36	1.8	43	2.3
Oriental	47	2.4	48	2.5
Other	7	.3	11	.58
C. Blue collar	9,047		8,439	
Negro	829	9.15	851	10.1
Oriental	350	3.9	339	4.01
Other	147	1.6	179	2.12
1. Less than journeyman	3,065		2,632	
Negro	521	17.3	533	20.3
Oriental	204	6.8	200	7.6
Other	47	1.6	59	2.24
2. Journeyman	3,507		3,295	
Negro	184	5.25	183	5.56
Oriental	89	2.5	92	2.8
Other	61	1.7	64	1.94
3. Above journeyman, less than supervisor	1,760		1,679	
Negro	120	6.8	130	7.7
Oriental	45	2.6	43	2.6
Other	98	5.6	55	3.3
4. First line supervisor	538		581	
Negro	4	.75	5	.9
Oriental	2	.4	3	.5
Other	0		1	.2

Merit System Violated in Negro Hiring Policy, Legion Charges

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GEORGE W. ANDREWS

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 30, 1963

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I desire to insert in the RECORD Mr. Joseph Young's column entitled "The Federal Spotlight," which appeared in a recent edition of the Washington Star and refers to a resolution passed by the American Legion in convention with regards to the hiring and promotions in the Federal Government.

The article follows:

MERIT SYSTEM VIOLATED IN NEGRO HIRING POLICY, LEGION CHARGES

(By Joseph Young)

The American Legion has condemned Kennedy administration policies in the hiring and promotions of Negroes in Government.

At its recent convention, the Legion unanimously approved a resolution accusing the administration of attempting to isolate the merit system in the hiring and promotions of Negroes.

The Legion declared, "an expedient policy of attempting to aggressively encourage employment in the Federal civil service without regard to its rules and regulations constitutes illegal preference and violates the principles of the merit system."

The Legion urged Congress to investigate fully the situation. Already a House Civil Service Manpower Subcommittee has started an investigation as to whether the administration's policies aimed at giving equal Government employment opportunities to Negroes constitutes discrimination in reverse—bypassing better-qualified whites for promotions and appointments.

The Legion acted on resolutions submitted by its Mississippi and Nevada State departments. The approved resolution deleted the

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site, there is a limitation on the yield of devices which can be tested underground there without unacceptable off-site seismic shock damage. It will be necessary to find and develop a second underground testing site for high-yield experiments.

Much greater discretion and flexibility in scheduling events and conducting tests will have to be given laboratory and test site personnel than was the case during our 1962 test series. At that time, I personally pointed out to Dr. Jerome Weisner, your science adviser, that his tendency, in your name, to act as test director from his office in Washington, remote from the Nevada and Pacific test sites, operated both to decrease the scientific data gained from the tests and increase the cost and difficulty of conducting them.

MAINTENANCE OF LABS AND RETENTION OF TOP-FLIGHT SCIENTISTS

The test-site improvements and testing discretion at the laboratory and test-site levels discussed above also have a bearing on our ability to keep topflight scientists' interest in the nuclear weapons program under partial test-ban conditions.

The added difficulties of analyzing samples from underground experiments—contaminated with extraneous elements from the soil—requires added radiochemistry facilities and personnel. Simulation facilities for other than underground environments and other limitations imposed by the treaty also require a boost in personnel and new laboratory physical facilities, equipment, and instrumentation for diagnostic and extrapolation purposes.

The flow of qualified and capable new, young, topflight scientists into the nuclear weapons laboratories must be stimulated and encouraged by stepped-up activities at such nonweapons, but related facilities, as the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley.

The importance of immediate starts on new laboratory facilities—as encouraging physical evidence to our nuclear weapon scientists now working that their efforts are not devoted to a dead-end program—is most vital to prevent them from drifting away from the laboratories.

PROMPT READINESS FOR ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

This capability must include readiness to proof test weapons systems in stockpile, new experimental devices, and weapons effects in a variety of environments and under all operational conditions.

Since testing, if and when resumed, will be under emergency conditions, considerable redundancy in test hardware is necessary in order that tests may be conducted promptly and not suffer delay from the unavailability of standby equipment.

A complete missile range, including ICBM silos at both ends and operational anti-ICBM installations at one end must be in readiness for proof tests of both ICBM and anti-ICBM weapons, as well as to determine effects of nuclear explosions on the reliability and capabilities of each.

Johnstone Island, little larger than an aircraft carrier, is unsuitable for installing equipment which must obtain test data simultaneously from different directions. This "triangulation" problem must be solved. Proper readiness involves an iron-clad agreement with the British for continuing access to and availability of Christmas Island facilities, installation of necessary testing equipment and facilities at Howland and Baker Islands, and construction of two, better three, unmanned floating test diagnostic ships, together with nuclear submarines which connect with these ships by underwater cable to protect test personnel safely underwater from the effects of weapons being tested.

Present aircraft available for collecting radioactive air samples at various vital altitudes are about worn out. They should be

replaced by a new fleet of approximately 12 fully equipped aircraft.

A second fleet of three diagnostic aircraft should be provided in addition to the fleet of three aircraft now being readied. This will provide both a stand-by capability and a simultaneous testing capability for air-dropped experimental devices.

Both drop aircraft and rocket vehicles must be in readiness for the delivery of test devices.

Facilities should be provided for constantly updating and revising test schedules for instantaneous use in the event of test resumption—similar to procedures for keeping our strategic deterrent plans always current.

BROADENING AND IMPROVING DETECTION CAPABILITIES

Both the importance of, and difficulties regarding, this effort, plus a necessity for strict classification of equipment and installations, call for a relatively large effort and expenditure in this area.

The very fuzzy situation respecting both space-detection hardware and space-testing procedures requires prompt clarification.

My preliminary estimates of the capital expenditure required for hardware and facilities to meet your assurances and keep your promises to take the actions necessary for reducing the risks and disadvantages of the partial test ban treaty are as follows:

Underground testing program:

	In millions
Nevada test site improvements and additions	\$50
Additional high-yield test site	50
Total	100

Maintenance of labs and top-flight scientists:

Los Alamos laboratory	25
Sandia laboratory	25
Livermore laboratory	50
Department of Defense laboratories	50
Education, training and encouragement of top-flight scientific personnel at weapons labs	10
Total	160

Readiness for atmospheric testing:

Test range, silos, missiles, A-ICBM equipment, etc., etc.	150
3 pairs—surface/submarine effects tests units	300
Drop aircraft and rockets for launching experimental devices	20
2d standby diagnostic fleet (3 fully equipped jet aircraft)	25
3 aircraft for shuttling samples from test sites to labs for prompt analysis	10
Air sampling fleet (12 jet aircraft)	15
Johnstone/Howland/Baker/Christmas Island testing complex	30
Rear base logistic facilities	10
Upper atmosphere and space diagnostic/detection equipment	50
Total	610

Detection system improvements:

Classified items	80
Miscellaneous and contingencies	50
Grand total	1,000

In addition to the foregoing capital outlays, which should be made promptly if we are to have a readiness for testing, it is estimated that the cost of maintaining, improving, and keeping this capability in constant readiness to move on an emergency basis will involve operating outlays of approximately \$250 million annually.

It is sincerely hoped that you are planning to call upon Congress forthwith for funds of the foregoing magnitude to take

the actions necessary to forestall, to the maximum extent possible, the disadvantages and risks to U.S. national security and survival inherent in the partial test ban treaty. Under the circumstance I see no possible course for me but to support such a request vigorously.

Very respectfully,

CRAIG HOSMER,
Member of Congress.

No. 10—Florida: The Gamblers' Paradise

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. PAUL A. FINO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 30, 1963

Mr. FINO. Mr. Speaker, today, I would lie to tell the Members of this House, more particularly the congressional delegation from the State of Florida about the importance of gambling in that State. In Florida, as in many other States, gambling is a billion dollar business oiling the wheels of organized crime syndicates.

Last year, \$158 million was gambled legally at Florida racetracks. This made the Sunshine State the sixth ranking in parimutuel betting which helped the State treasury to the tune of over \$13½ million in 1962.

However, Mr. Speaker, this accounts for only a small part of the money wagered in Florida last year. It is illegal betting which lines the pockets of the criminals and it is illegal betting that makes up the great bulk of the gambling that takes place in that State.

Miami is a national nerve center of the gambling syndicates. According to the McClellan committee, Florida's share of estimates of off-track betting came to almost \$1.4 billion in 1962.

But, off-track betting is not the only form of illegal gambling. The consensus of testimony before the McClellan committee was that off-track betting accounts for less than half of the total illegal wagering in the United States. In the light of these figures, gambling in Florida may well have seen a \$2½ billion turnover last year.

The gross profits of the gamblers could very well have been in the neighborhood of a one-fourth billion dollars. Certain expenses must be met, because illegal gambling supports public corruption as well as organized crime and its various other illicit endeavors. This has given organized crime quite a bankroll in Florida. Because of its social ignorance Florida is bankrolling the mob.

If gambling were both legal and controlled, Mr. Speaker, there would be no great opportunities for corruption and the crime syndicate's treasury would be badly depleted.

The best form of controlled and legalized gambling is a national lottery. Throughout the world, it has shown itself effective in cutting the financial prop of gambling out from under the crime rings, while at the same time causing new revenues to flow into the Public Treasury.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE <i>2 Oct 63</i>
TO: <i>DCI</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
<i>7E12 Hq</i>		
REMARKS:		
<p>Walt: I am sure the Director will be interested in the attached, which is an insert of Hosmer's letter to the President concerning the test ban treaty.</p> <p><i>file</i></p> <p><i>[Signature]</i></p>		
FROM:		
<i>OGC/LC</i>		<i>7D01</i>
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION